The study of network robustness focuses on the way the overall functionality of a network is affected as some of its constituent parts fail. Failures can occur at random or be part of an intentional attack and, in general, networks behave differently against different removal strategies. Although much effort has been put on this topic, there is no unified framework to study the problem. Whilst random failures have been mostly studied under percolation theory, targeted attacks have been recently restated in terms of network dismantling. In this work, we link these two approaches by performing a finite-size scaling analysis to four dismantling strategies over Erdös-Rényi networks: initial and recalculated high degree removal (ID and RD) and initial and recalculated high betweenness removal (IB and RB). We find that both degree-based attacks lie into the same universality class, but the betweenness-based attacks differ significantly. In particular, RB produces a very abrupt transition with a hump in the cluster size distribution near the critical point, resembling some explosive percolation processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of percolation in complex networks is a current research topic that has both theoretical inquires [1, 2] and practical applications. For instance, percolation transitions are observed in many biological, social and technological complex networks [3, 4] and are connected to the problem of resilience to damage [5] [6] [7] [8] and therefore to the functionality of the systems associated with the networks. Also, theoretical tools devised for the analysis of percolation have been used in the study of disease spreading [9] , city traffic dynamics [10] , and the structural characterization of networks [11] , among others. In particular, random failures of systems such as power grids have been successfully described as percolation processes on a graph representing the underlying system [12] .
Failures are usually modeled as random deletions of nodes or links, while in attacks influential nodes or links are removed according to a rank of specific characteristics, trying to produce the greatest damage to the network. The effectiveness of the attack depends on the topological features of the network as well as on the type of attack. For this reason, several network architectures were studied under different attacks to evaluate both the robustness of networks and the effectiveness of attacks [13] [14] [15] . For instance, it is widely known that scale-free networks are fragile against centrality targeted attacks [13, [16] [17] [18] but robust against random failures [18] . On the other hand, homogeneous degree distributed networks, such as Erdős-Rényi (ER) networks, are expected to be robust under targeted attacks. In particular, they have been proved to be robust against degree-based attacks [19] . However, there are some networks that are fragile to targeted attacks despite having homogeneous degree distributions. One such example is the US power grid, which is particularly fragile when nodes with high load are deleted [20] . Another example is the Watts-Strogatz model of small-world homogeneous networks since they have been proved to be particularly fragile in a cascading failure scenario. Xia et al. [21] attributed the fragility of these networks to the heterogeneous betweenness distribution they have. Attacks based on betweenness are among the most efficient attacks to dismantling a network [7, [13] [14] [15] and are particularly effective in networks having a heterogeneous betweenness distribution. However, in Erdős-Rényi networks, where both degree and betweenness distributions are homogeneous [21, 22] , a betweenness-based attack is not expected to outperform other targeted attacks. As we will show in this article, this is not the case. In particular, the recalculated version of the betweenness-based attack on nodes is particularly effective to destroy ER networks, being comparable to the most efficient methods to dismantle networks [23, 24] .
In this work, we study percolation processes on ER networks under different attack strategies using finitesize scaling analysis to assess the nature of the transition to the fragmented phase. Our results show that, for re-calculated betweenness-based attacks, the transition is sharper than in random failures or degree-based attacks, having is own universality class. In particular, the critical exponent associated with the scaling of the giant component at the critical point is comparable to what has been found in explosive percolation models [25, 26] .
A. Attack strategies
In centrality-based attacks, nodes are sorted in decreasing order according to a centrality measure. Then, they are sequentially removed according to that list (ties, if any, are usually broken randomly). There is an extensive list of centrality measures that have been tested in multiple networks (see, for example, [14] ). Some of the most popular are degree, betweenness [27] , closeness, eigenvector and collective influence [28] . In general, when a node is removed, the centrality values of the remaining nodes change. Thus, the attack can be improved by recomputing the list after each removal step. If the centrality measure uses only local information, like degree or collective influence, only a fraction of nodes will eventually change, so the original ordering of the nodes may remain the same after several steps. On the other hand, measures like betweenness or eigenvector centrality use global information, so even the deletion of a single node can potentially change the ordering in a significant way. Given that the recalculated version of an attack uses more updated information of the network, it is in general more efficient than its initial counterpart [14] .
In this work, we will focus on both the initial and recalculated versions of the attacks based on two centrality measures: degree and betweenness. The first one is probably the most studied centrality measure in the literature, and there are several reasons for that. First, it is a very intuitive measure and can be easily interpreted in terms of network connectivity. Also, being strictly local it is easy to compute and suitable for making analytical predictions. On the other hand, betweenness can be thought as the amount of load a node must support when there is some kind of flux on the network. Nodes with higher betweenness articulate different groups of nodes and their importance is more related to the communicability of the network. Being a global measure, its computation is hard. The most efficient algorithm so far known was proposed by Brandes, et al. in [29] and runs like O(N M ), where N and M are the number of nodes and links in the network, respectively. The main reason for considering this measure is that it has been reported as the most efficient attack strategy for many networks, including both synthetic and real-world networks [14, 15] .
B. Percolation
Site percolation in complex networks can be stated by considering that each node of the network can be either occupied, with probability p, or unoccupied, with probability 1 − p. Only occupied nodes can be connected to each other, thus links connecting at least one unoccupied node are also considered unoccupied. If p = 0, the network is empty and if p = 1, the original network is recovered. When the occupation probability is small, occupied nodes belong to different small-sized components, but above a critical value p = p c , one of the components acquires an extensive size. At this point, it is said that the system percolates. The extensive component is known as the giant connected component (GCC) and the critical point is referred to as the percolation threshold.
Let N be the size of the network and N 1 the size of the GCC. In the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, percolation theory states that the relative size S 1 = N 1 /N follows the critical behavior
where a is a proportionality constant and β > 0 is the critical exponent associated to S 1 . The transition between the percolated and non-percolated state has been widely studied in statistical physics, and it has been shown to exhibit a continuous transition in many different network models. In this framework, S 1 is considered the order parameter of the transition.
As it occurs in continuous transitions, other measures also manifest a critical behavior near the percolation threshold. One such measure is the average cluster size, which plays the role of susceptibility and is computed as
where n s (p) is the number of clusters of size s per node and the primed sum excludes the GCC. At the critical point, s diverges in the thermodynamic limit as s ∼ (p − p c ) −γ , with γ > 0. Also, n s (p) has its own critical behavior and close to p c it becomes very heterogeneous, being well described by the expression
Here s * represents the characteristic cluster size, which scales as s * ∼ |p − p c | −1/σ . Then, at p = p c the number of clusters of size s follows a power-law n s (p) ∼ s −τ . Finally, the correlation length ξ, defined as the geometrical length of a typical cluster, scales as ξ ∼ (p−p c ) −ν , where ν > 0 [30] .
The theory of critical phenomena states that continuous transitions can be fully characterized by its critical exponents. If the same exponents are shared between two systems, they belong to the same universality class. In percolation only two exponents are independent, and the others can be derived using different scaling relations. For example, the exponent associated with the cluster size distribution can be obtained as [30] 
As β and γ are both positive, equation 4 shows that τ ≥ 2. Another useful relation is given by [31] 2β + γ =ν,
whereν = dν, being d the effective dimension of the network. Standard site percolation on Erdős-Rényi graphs has the same critical behavior than on the Bethe lattice [32] , with effective dimension d = 6 and critical exponents β = γ = 1,ν = 3, σ = 1/2, and τ = 5/2. Also, in uncorrelated networks, the percolation threshold is given by [33] 
where κ = k 2 / k is the heterogeneity parameter of the degree distribution.
From a theoretical point of view, standard percolation and node removal are different processes [18] . Percolation is an equilibrium reversible process, well described by the equilibrium statistical physics. On the other hand, node removal under specific attacks-for instance, RB attack-are irreversible processes such as the evolving rules that turn out in explosive percolation transitions [26] . Being aware of this, we relate the percolation probability p with a node removal procedure in which a fraction f = 1 − p of nodes were removed. Using this relation we can apply the tools provided by percolation theory to the attack strategies previously described.
II. RESULTS
A. Percolation transition Figure 1 shows the evolution of the size of the giant component as a function of the fraction of removed nodes f on an ER network with mean degree k = 4. Each curve corresponds to a different attack, namely recalculated betweenness (RB), recalculated degree (RD), initial betweenness (IB), initial degree (ID) and random removal (Rnd). When a small network is considered (upper panel), it can be seen that ID performs better than IB. As it has been previously reported by Iyer, et al. in [14] , the situation reverts when the list of nodes is recalculated after each node removal, with RB outperforming RD. When a bigger network with the same characteristics is attacked (lower panel), all the transitions become sharper. Except for RB, all the curves seem to be consistent with a continuous percolation transition. The curve for recalculated betweenness, on the other side, exhibits a very abrupt collapse at f ∼ 0.23, with a very steep slope. Interestingly, for lower values of f this attack performs poorly (see inset), barely outperforming random removal. 
B. Finite-size scaling analysis
Finite-size scaling analysis is one of the most important tools to studying phase transitions and in particular to obtaining the associated critical exponents [31, 34, 35] . According to this theory, the relative size of each component scales as [35] 
where f c is the percolation threshold andS i are universal functions. The subscript i = 1, 2, ... indicates the rank of each component, sorted by size in decreasing order. This scaling relation holds asymptotically, i.e. in the limit N → ∞ and f → f c , and it can be used for estimating the critical exponents β andν. In particular, when f = f c , this relation implies that S i (0, N ) ∼ N −β/ν . Thus the plot of S i vs N at the percolation threshold should give a straight line in a log-log scale with slope −β/ν. As we show in the Supplementary Material, the exponentν (and thus, β) can also be estimated independently from Eq. 7, as well as the percolation threshold f c . Similarly, the scaling ansatz for the susceptibility is
from which the quotient γ/ν can be estimated.
In Figure 2 we show the behavior of the relevant quantities introduced previously for different system sizes in the case of degree-based attacks (ID and RD). As can be seen from the order parameter S 1 , the transition becomes sharper as N increases. In addition, the size of Table I ). Left panels correspond to ID and right panels to RD. All measures were averaged over 10 5 realizations.
the second largest component N 2 and the average finitecluster size s peak around the transition. In both cases, the height of the peaks of these two measures follows a power-law dependence with the network size, also the giant component scales as a power law with the size of the system at the critical point f c (not shown). From these results and using Eqs. (7) and (8) we obtain the quotients β/ν and γ/ν, as well as the critical exponentν and the percolation threshold f c (for details see Supplementary Material). As a consistency test, the insets in Fig. 2 show the curves re-scaled using the exponents obtained.
As can be seen, the collapse is very good in all cases, validating the analysis. The recalculated version of the degree-based attack is more effective than the initial version from a dismantling point of view, in the sense that it lowers the percolation threshold from f (IB) c = 0.3608(9) to f (RB) c = 0.2737 (7) . But within numerical errors, these two phenomena exhibit the same critical exponents (see Table I ), suggesting that they belong to the same universality class. The exponents found are different from the mean-field values, corresponding to standard percolation, but it is worth noting that the quotients β/ν and γ/ν are close to the corresponding mean-field values.
For the betweenness-based attacks (Figure 3) , the scenario has some differences. The initial version of the attack is a rather poor dismantling strategy, with a percolation threshold of f (IB) c = 0.46(2), which is the closest value to random removal among the attacks here considered. Also, the estimation of the critical exponents indicates that this attack belongs to the same universality class as standard percolation. On the other hand, RB is the most aggressive strategy, with an estimated percolation threshold of f (RB) c = 0.227 (1) . Also, the critical exponents depart significantly from mean-field. The sharpness of the transition produced by this strategy is quantified by the quotient β/ν = 0.17 (4) , and the significant fluctuations of the cluster distribution by γ/ν = 0.80 (4) . The estimation of the correlation length exponent gives ν = 1.54(4)-at least, up to the sizes analyzed-implying a scaling of the giant component with associated exponent β = 0.26 (4) . Although this value is significantly lower than the expected for standard percolation, it is strictly greater than zero, indicating that the transition is continuous. Transitions with these characteristics have been found in the context of explosive percolation [1, 25] .
C. Cluster size distribution
As it was previously explained, second-order percolation transitions exhibit a power-law cluster size distribution at the critical point given by Eq. 3. In Figure 4 , we show that this is indeed the case for the two degree-based attacks and the initial betweenness attack. The expo-nents of the respective power-laws-which were measured directly from n(s) using a linear fit in logarithmic scaleare in agreement with the scaling relation given by Eq. 4 and are consistent, considering uncertainties, with the value τ = 2.5 correspondent to standard percolation (see Table I ). The case of recalculated betweenness deserves special consideration since it departs from the mean-field universality class as we pointed out below. Although a power-law decaying can be seen for small cluster sizes, the distribution shows a hump at higher values departing from the expected behavior. In a similar manner to what happens with the abrupt drop in the order parameter near the transition, this behavior misleadingly points to a first-order phase transition. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that similar effects have been observed in other continuous transitions in the context of explosive percolation models [1, 36] . Here we argue that the hump is due to a finite-size transient effect and that it must disappear for larger system sizes. Using a heuristic argument similar to that of ref. [1] , we can estimate a crossover size N * , where the system becomes large enough so that realizations converge to the asymptotic limiting behavior. Let ∆S max be the greatest jump for the order parameter after removing a node in a single realization. The variation in the control parameter f in this single step is ∆f = 1/N . Assuming that this jump occurs at f c and using the scaling of the order parameter, we can roughly state that ∆S max ∼ ∆f −β = N β . Now, we define N * as the system size for which the greatest jump in the giant component is about ten percent. Thus, N * ∼ 10 1/β . For the RB attack, β = 0.26 yielding N * ∼ 10 4 . As the results presented in Figure 4 correspond to N = 8000, we are still under the crossover size, which might explain the deviation from the power-law. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the percolation transitions induced by four dismantling strategies based on centrality measures over Erdős-Rényi networks. By performing a systematic finite-size scaling analysis, we have obtained both the percolation thresholds and the critical exponents that characterize the universality class of the transitions. By computing the percolation thresholds, we were able to verify and quantify the intuitive idea that the attack strategies become more effective when node centrality is updated after each removal step. Interestingly, recomputing node centrality does not necessarily change the nature of the transition, as we realize in the case of the degree-based attacks. Although both degree-based attacks belong to the same universality class, they do not have all the mean-field exponents, so we conclude that their universality class are different from random removal. This contrasts with a previous result reported in [37] , where the authors show that an RD attack on two-dimensional proximity graphs behaves as standard percolation.
Regarding betweenness-based attacks, we have found that, when the initial centrality list is employed, the attack performs rather poorly as a dismantling strategy. Also, finite-size scaling shows that this procedure behaves as random removal. This can be understood by taking into account that betweenness is a global measure. After each removal (especially if a high betweenness node is removed), the betweenness of the rest of the nodes is affected and can potentially change in a nontrivial manner. This implies that, after several removal steps, the original list does not provide useful information about node centrality and thus, no significant improvement with respect to random removal is obtained. This flaw of the initial betweenness attack is improved by the recalculated version. However, RB attack is computationally more demanding, thus reaching large networks sizes becomes practically impossible.
Interestingly, the recalculated betweenness attack is particularly effective being comparable to the most effective methods to dismantle networks [15, 23, 24] . Also, the critical exponents of the percolation process associated with this attack are nontrivial, as they depart from the mean-field values observed in random attacks to ER networks and the other attacks evaluated in this work. In particular, the transition of the order parameter in RB is sharper than the corresponding to the other attacks, resembling an explosive percolation process [25, 31] . Finitesize effects are more pronounced in recalculated attacks, this is possibly because correlations become important during the sequential removal of nodes. Such correlations have been observed in optimal algorithms to dismantle networks [23] , suggesting that dismantling is an intrinsically collective problem. From a dismantling point of view, recalculated betweenness is the most efficient attack, as it is the one exhibiting the lowest percolation threshold. In fact, its performance is comparable to the most effective methods to dismantle networks [15, 23, 24] . Also, the critical exponents of the percolation process associated to this attack are far from trivial, and resemble the behavior observed in explosive percolation transitions [25, 31] . At variance with the degree-based attacks where the order parameter gradually decays towards zero, the dismantling with recalculated betweenness proceeds more silently, giving a misleading picture of integrity even at the edge of a catastrophic failure. If we think of infrastructures such as power grids, road networks or the Internet, it is reasonable to conceive heavy loaded nodes as the most prone to failure, so RB-like damages are possible not only as a targeted attack but as a failure. Other authors have studied the vulnerability of these systems in terms of cascading failures using as a proxy for the loads the betweenness of the nodes [12, 22] . From a novel perspective, our work adds more evidence to point out that many systems-in which our modern life relies on-may seem robust but hinder critical vulnerabilities.
